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Abstract— The paper introduces an approach to structuring 
assurance cases using specially-designed CAE building blocks. 
The blocks are derived from an empirical analysis of the real case 
structures and can standardise the presentation of assurance 
cases by simplifying their architecture. CAE building blocks 
might also increase the precision and efficiency of the claims in 
arguments and can be used as self-contained reusable 
components of formal and semi-formal assurance cases. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Claims, Arguments and Evidence (CAE) has been in use 
for many years for reasoning and communicating about safety 
and assurance [1][2]. Various approaches have been proposed 
to increase rigour and confidence in cases [3][4][5]. The 
solution we are developing will provide a set of resources for 
using CAE to support authors of assurance cases. This paper 
focuses on one of these resources – CAE building blocks. 
We describe the CAE resources we are developing in terms 
of a stack (Fig. 1). At the bottom of the stack is guidance on the 
basic concepts of claims, arguments and evidence. At the next 
level up in the stack, we define certain combinations of CAE 
that form the basic building blocks of the approach. These 
blocks can be then combined into fragments of cases, where it 
is possible to define typical structures and templates that could 
be used in a particular class of problems. The templates and 
exemplars support the development of the overall safety or 
assurance cases, which should provide a technically-based 
narrative of the assurance.  
 
Figure 1. Schematic of the CAE stack. 
We loosely use a words/sentences and grammar/ 
paragraphs/narrative stories metaphor to illustrate the approach 
(see the right side of Fig. 1). Claims, arguments, evidence are 
small units of cases – just like single words that are the 
smallest distinct meaningful elements of speech or writing. 
Words are used together to form a sentence by following 
specific grammar rules. If the rules are applied correctly, the 
resulting sentences will be well-formed. Similarly, the claims, 
arguments and evidence are combined together by using the 
proposed building blocks (‘rules’) to obtain the correct and 
well-formed block instances (‘sentences’). 
This paper is structured in the following way. A brief 
introduction into the CAE approach is provided in Section II. 
Then CAE building blocks, which are the main focus of this 
paper, are defined and discussed in detail: the concept of CAE 
building blocks is introduced in Section III, the collection of 
basic blocks with their description is provided in Section IV 
and some initial guidance on using the blocks is given in 
Section V. The concluding remarks and future directions are 
outlined in Section VI. 
II. CLAIMS, ARGUMENTS, EVIDENCE 
A. Background and basic concepts 
Over the past ten years there has been a trend towards an 
explicit claim-based approach to safety justification and 
considerable work has been done on the structuring of safety 
arguments [1][7][8][9][10]. The approach used here is a CAE 
approach with the following key elements: 
• Claims – assertions put forward for general acceptance. 
They are typically statements about a property of the 
system or some subsystem. Claims that are asserted as 
true without justification become assumptions and 
claims supporting an argument are called subclaims. 
• Evidence that is used as the basis of the justification of 
the claim. Sources of evidence may include the design, 
the development process, prior field experience, testing, 
source code analysis or formal analysis. 
• Arguments link the evidence to the claim. They are 
defined as Toulmin’s warrants and are the “statements 
indicating the general ways of arguing being applied in 
a particular case and implicitly relied on and whose 
trustworthiness is well established” [11], together with 
the validation for the scientific and engineering laws 
used. 
In order to support the use of CAE, a graphical notation 
ASCAD [1] is used to describe the interrelationship of the 
claims, argument and evidence. In addition to the graphical 
presentation, there is important narrative and analyses 
explaining and detailing the claims and arguments being made. 
Narrative is an essential part of the case and tools such as the 
Adelard ASCE tool [12] explicitly support it. In the next 
section we briefly discuss the balance between formality and 
informality in the use of this notation. 
B. Balancing the formal and informal 
The CAE approach supports the creative process of 
architecting a safety or assurance case. The development of the 
case can be seen in terms of moving around the nodes of Fig. 2. 
We might express our initial thoughts for the safety 
justification or assurance case informally in terms of arrows 
and circles as an influence diagram, showing, as the name 
suggests, the various factors that might influence the property 
we are reasoning about. As we develop our understanding, we 
move towards defining more precise claims and arguments and 
a clearer view of potential evidence. Our understanding can be 
informed by a variety of engineering models that underpin 
these claims: we need to know what the claim is about and we 
need to be able to reason about properties of the system. As the 
claims become more precise, we relate them to these 
engineering models to give them semantics. In addition, the 
CAE structure needs to be more detailed and rigorous and the 
claim decompositions carefully justified, reflecting the 
principle that the more onerous the claims are for a system, the 
more precision and rigour is needed in how they are justified. 
Despite the experience and existing approaches referred to 
above, the practice of how to structure and present cases is very 
varied. In this research we have reviewed many cases, from 
different industries, and found a wide range of styles and 
expressiveness. The cases reflect different trade-offs and stages 
of development and also reflect the lack of guidance on 
structuring. The wide variety of approaches makes it difficult 
to compare cases, hard to provide a more rigorous semantics 
and hard to provide exemplar cases. 
 
Figure 2. Development of a justification – from informal mental model to 
structured models. 
To address the aforementioned issues and provide a more 
rigorous approach to architecting cases, we have defined 
specific rules that restrict the type of CAE structures and 
developed a collection of CAE building blocks. 
III. THE CONCEPT AND DEFINITION OF CAE BLOCKS 
CAE building blocks are a series of archetypal CAE 
fragments. They are based on the CAE normal form, which is a 
standardised structure that we defined for combining claims, 
arguments and evidence with further simplification and 
enhancements. One enhancement is to how we address 
arguments. In CAE an argument is the way in which we 
explore, given the evidence and assumptions, whether a claim 
might be true. As discussed above, an argument is initially 
defined as Toulmin’s warrant [11]. 
However, we extend this in a number of ways by analysing 
the proposed warrant to identify those aspects of the argument 
that allow us to logically show that the claim is valid. We call 
these aspects of the warrant “side-warrants”. Side-warrants tell 
us why we can deduce the top-level claim from the subclaims, 
and under what circumstances the argument is valid, in such a 
way that the correctness of each argument could be decided 
more easily. We require arguments to be both logical and 
explanatory: we require the reasoning to provide us with 
sufficient understanding of the case that is being made. 
The side-warrant is in fact a type of claim and we may wish 
to challenge and demonstrate this for the specific case. We 
could do this either by introducing sub-claims that the analysis 
is indeed worst-case or by justifying the side-warrant directly. 
The side-warrants can then be supported either by further 
decomposition, or by narrative argument: in Toulmin’s 
terminology backing may be introduced to justify the general 
validity of the warrant to support the specific application of it 
in the argument being discussed.  
The basic scheme of a generic CAE block structure is 
shown in Fig. 3 below. It shows n subclaims supporting an 
argument that justifies a top-level claim, with some of the key 
properties of the argument expressed as the side-warrant and 
supported by the system information and external backing. 
Claim
Subclaim nSubclaim 2
Argument
Subclaim 1 - - -
Side
warrant
System
information
External
backing
 
Figure 3. General CAE Block Structure. 
Part of the skill in architecting a CAE fragment is in 
identifying the key properties that should be justified separately 
in the side-warrant. If we consider the simple example of Fig. 4 
we might find that the only side-warrant we can identify is  
C11 /\ C12 => C1, which makes the verification trivial (just 
modus ponens)
1
 but pushes the justification into that for the 
warrant. Or we may find that if a property referenced in the 
subclaims distributes then we can infer C1 from the subclaims.  
W
Claim C1
Argument A
Sublaim C12Sublaim C11
Figure 4. Simple example of CAE fragment with side-warrant. 
The side-warrant reminds us of the reasoning we are 
claiming is true of the block. This may prompt us to detail 
further the CAE structure as breaking it into more steps may 
identity how we can make the justification valid. Or it may be 
that the block is a simple one (perhaps C1 is just the 
conjunction of C11 and C12). Alternatively it may be that we 
can appeal to some general result or authority to justify the 
side-warrant.  
The overall justification for the block and its application 
can be included in the argument node narration or 
accompanying text for the block. As shown in Fig. 3, both the 
argument node and the side-warrant can be supported by 
additional data: system information and external backings. The 
former includes any system related information that drives the 
justification: models of system objects and properties, 
information from the product specification or user 
documentation, etc. The latter includes facts, guidance, 
theorems, theories that are appealed to as true statements of 
facts external to the warrant. The warrant might rely on 
external backing when demonstrating the claim, so if the 
backing itself is questionable, it must be justified separately 
prior to being used in the warrant. 
Side-warrant, system information and external backings 
elements are optional and can be omitted when they are 
considered unnecessary, although the block will still need 
justifying. We can therefore deploy CAE blocks with different 
balances between the graphical and textual, and between the 
formal and informal reasoning. 
IV. THE COLLECTION OF BASIC CAE BUILDING BLOCKS
So far we have identified five basic CAE building blocks. 
The structure and description of these blocks are provided in 
this section. The blocks are derived from an empirical analysis 
of what is trying to be expressed in real cases. We reviewed the 
structure of a wide range of real cases from the defence, 
medical, financial and nuclear sectors concerning, for example, 
1
 We have experimented with a number of logical semantics for the CAE
notation, a simple one comes from propositionalising the claims and the 
warrant so: C11 /\ C12 /\ W => C1  
command and control, training systems, smart devices and 
weapons safety. We believe the resulting set of blocks is 
sufficiently powerful to capture the majority of what is to be 
expressed. 
A. Decomposition block 
A decomposition block is used to claim that a conclusion 
about the whole object, process, property or function can be 
deduced from the claims or facts about constituent parts. 
More formally, this block is used to show that property 
P(X) of object, function or process X can be demonstrated by 
reference to properties P1(X1)⋀ P2(X2)⋀…⋀Pi(Xn) of its sub-
objects X1, X2,…, Xn from which it is composed. The sub-
objects can be artefacts, processes, environments, 
configurations, functions, organisations etc.  
For example, we may claim that if a property holds for each 
sub-system of a system in a given environment and 
configuration, then the property holds for the system as a 
whole in that environment and configuration. 
Decomposition block is concerned with the structure. Many 
claim decompositions are about partitioning some aspect of the 
claim, for example, according to the functions of the system, 
the architecture, the properties being considered, or with 
respect to some sequence such as lifecycle phases or modes of 
operation.  
The basic idea is very simple: in many cases in order to 
make a claim about a property of an object, we need to 
investigate whether the object has this property by evaluating 
its components. To do this, we need to be clear about what the 
property is and we also need rules about how we view the 
object as being composed of components and how 
the properties of these components can be combined (e.g., 
how reliability properties of components are combined 
when the degree of independence is not known).  
Double decomposition is the most general form in which a 
claim that a property of an object can be deduced from the 
other properties of the constituting sub-objects. Single 
decomposition is when either the property or the object is being 
decomposed, not both. A general example of single object 
decomposition is shown in Fig. 5. 
P(X)
(P(X1) /\ P(X2) /\ ... /\P(Xn) =
P(X1+X2+...+Xn)) /\
(X=X1+X2+...+Xn)
Decomposition
P(X1) P(Xn)P(X2) - - -
Figure 5. Single object decomposition. 
It is important not to forget the mechanisms that combine 
the elements together, when decomposing into sub-objects or 
sub-properties. 
The side-warrant justifying the decomposition should 
demonstrate that the object X is composed of X1 to Xn and the 
property P distributes over the composition. Note that Xn 
should include the composition mechanism itself. 
B. Substitution block 
Another common type of claim expansion involves 
transforming a claim about an object into a claim about a 
similar object, which can be viewed as a form of substitution. 
Substitution block is used to claim that if a property holds 
for one object, then it holds for an equivalent object. Similarly, 
if one property holds for an object then an equivalent property 
may also hold for the same (or equivalent) object. The nature 
of this “equivalence” will vary with the object and property and 
will need to be defined.  
The structure of the block is shown in Fig. 6 below. It is 
presented in its most general form where either or 
both property and object can be shown to equivalent. 
Substitution block uses an argument from analogy to infer 
the conclusion. The similarities of objects or properties form 
the basis for analogical inference and should be clearly 
communicated and justified in the side-warrant. More formally, 
the block is used to deduce P(X) from Q(Y), when Q(X) is 
equivalent to P(Y) in a particular context, where P and Q are 
properties of objects X and Y respectively. 
A common application of this block is to claim that if a 
property holds for one object, it holds for another object. For 
example, we might claim that the evaluated system has a 
certain property, and therefore the production system has this 
property too, providing that the production system is equivalent 
in some clearly defined way to the evaluated one. 
Another example is when we have demonstrated a property 
on a design (e.g. does not deadlock) and we can show that the 
design model analysed by the tool is equivalent to the actual 
design (e.g. is a correct abstraction and functionality that has 
been omitted does not impact the deadlock property). 
P(X)
Q(Y)
Substitution
Q(Y) is equivalent
to P(X)
Figure 6. Object and property substitution. 
It should be noted that justifying the equivalence between 
objects or properties is not a straightforward task and it can be 
a fallacy to argue from the specific to the general. So the 
substitution block should be used carefully and the side-
warrant will itself usually need elaborating into a substantial 
argument. Making the side-warrant explicit and demonstrating 
it separately is one of the advantages of this block. 
C. Evidence incorporation block 
Evidence incorporation block is used at the edge of the case 
tree to incorporate the evidence elements. The block 
demonstrates that a sub-claim is directly satisfied by its 
supporting evidence. 
The basic structure of the block is shown in Fig. 7. A 
property P(X) of object X is justified directly from the contents 
of R, where R are accepted facts. 
P(X)
evidence
incorporation
Results R
P(X)
Results R
Figure 7. Forms of evidence incorporation block. 
As with other blocks, the use of the argument node is to 
provide a justification for why the evidence can directly show 
the claim. If this is deemed unnecessary due to the closeness of 
the claim and the evidence, then the alternative form shown in 
the right hand side might be used. 
D. Concretion  
Concretion block is significantly different from the other 
blocks: it is used when a claim needs to be given a more 
precise definition or interpretation and may break the formal 
reasoning from the lower claims to the top-level claims. It 
represents an important part of many cases where un-
interpreted claims are being given a meaning or claims become 
operationalised into forms that can be shown to be satisfied. 
The general structure of the block is shown in Fig. 8 below. 
P(X)
Concretion
P1(X1)
P := P1, X := X1
Figure 8. Concretion block structure. 
The top claim P(X) is concreted into a more precise claim 
P1(X1) by defining P as P1, and X as X1. The concretion can 
apply to the environment, the system, the configuration or the 
property. 
This block is used when a general object, function, process 
or property can be defined in terms of a more specific way in a 
particular context. For example, if the top claim about some 
system attribute is too vague to be demonstrated by a 
convincing argument that it is valid, it might be transformed 
and expressed in more measurable less abstract terms. This 
transformation from something vague to something more 
precise is called “concretion”, hence the block name. 
The concretion block is different from the substitution 
block: substitution is arguing by analogy using some 
similarities of objects or properties, concretion argues by 
interpretation, giving something a meaning rather than by 
analogy. 
Because the use of concretion may break the formal 
reasoning from the lower claims to the top-level claims, it 
should always be clearly identified. 
E. Calculation block 
Calculation block is used to claim that the value of a 
property of a system in a given environment and configuration 
can be computed from the values of related properties of other 
objects in that environment and configuration. 
For example, we might argue that the average time of data 
retrieval from a database can be calculated from the probability 
that the data is in the cache (a property of one sub-system) and 
the time of data retrieval if it is not in the cache (a property of 
the other sub-system). 
Fig. 9 shows the general structure of the calculation block 
assuming the environment E and configuration C of the system 
X are the same for all claims (defined outside of the block). In 
the figure Q, Q1, Q2,…, Qi, are properties of objects X, X1, X2, 
…, Xi, with values a1 to ai, and b is a property/value that is 
computed (deduced/calculated) from the a values. The value of 
Q(X, E, C) can be deduced from the values of Q1(X1, E, C) to 
Qi(Xi, E, C) using the function or formula F. 
- - - - - -
Calculation/Proof b = F(a1, a2, ..., ai)
Q(X, E, C) = b
Qi(Xi, E, C) = aiQ1(X1, E, C) = a1 Q2(X2, E, C) = a2
Figure 9. Structure of the calculation block. 
Calculation block is used when a claim contains some 
numerical value of a property that can be calculated from a set 
of other values of related properties of the system in the same 
environment and configuration. For example, we might make a 
claim about the average availability of system based on the 
subclaims about the system’s failure rate and recovery time 
values. 
 Calculation could also be seen as a composite block 
combining a decomposition block in which the properties have 
values with a substitution block.  
V. USING AND SELECTING BLOCKS 
A. Combining blocks 
In practice, some of the basic blocks are often merged 
together into composite blocks. In such situations, it may not 
always be obvious which basic patterns have been applied, 
expanding the structure further into a more detailed case could 
help us understand the underlying logic and see which basic 
blocks have been applied.  
We have identified a few common composite blocks that 
are used in practice. These are: 
• Substitution + decomposition. This composite block is
used when a claim about an object is decomposed into a
set of claims about an equivalent object. In a more
detailed case one could use a substitution block to
replace one object or property with another object or
properties first, and then apply the decomposition block
to partition some aspect of the new claim.
• Concretion + decomposition. This composite block is
used when some aspect of the claim is given a more
precise interpretation and some aspect of the new claim
is partitioned at the same time.
• Any basic block + evidence incorporation. To keep the
case concise, evidence nodes are often incorporated
right away when applying a basic block. In that case the
justification showing why the evidence directly
supports the claim is provided in the argument node of
the basic block used.
In the block definitions, we talk about an object, such as a 
system. Sometimes, we may wish to make the environment and 
configuration explicit but otherwise we may keep them implicit 
to make the case easier to read. Similarly, we have not made 
confidence or trust explicit. When we make a claim, 
confidence is implicit. If we wish to make it explicit, each 
property could have a confidence value: we would then need a 
calculus for devising and propagating confidence values: an 
active research topic in its own right 
B. Applying blocks 
The CAE blocks are meant to support the creative process 
of constructing a case. They do not themselves show us how to 
architect cases: the deployment of blocks and how to architect 
cases from them will be the subject of another working paper. 
The CAE blocks are currently being applied within a 
number of applied research projects including the EU 
Harmonics project. As indicated in the introduction we are 
making more detailed resources available [13] and hope to 
report on their more general application at a later date. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have introduced some Building Blocks for 
Assurance Cases. The blocks are derived from an empirical 
analysis of real cases and can standardise the presentation of 
assurance cases by simplifying their architecture. CAE blocks 
increase the precision and efficiency of the claims in arguments 
because each claim instantiated from a block inherits a formal 
representation as part of the block. This can turn blocks into 
reusable, self-contained components that could become the 
main building blocks of formal and semi-formal assurance 
cases. Furthermore, the way the blocks are structured facilitates 
the challenge and formal verification of their correct 
application and stresses the validation with respect to the real 
world. 
The paper does not address the detailed deployment of the 
CAE blocks, nor does it describe how to challenge cases – a 
crucial part of gaining confidence in them. We also envisage 
domain specific versions of the CAE blocks and templates and 
are developing these for statistical testing, static analysis and 
security informed safety. In parallel we are developing the 
Adelard ASCE tool to directly support the implementation of 
the CAE blocks. 
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